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INTRODUCTION

“Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from
magic.”1 As technology and science advance with increasing speed
and scope, courts are tasked with increasingly difficult
determinations on admissibility of evidence.2 Using in-court experts
to explain scientific methods has become necessary; however, this
necessity carries the risk of tainting judges and juries with unreliable
“junk science.”3 This problem demands a standard to balance the
need for expert testimony against the corresponding risk of
deception.
Over ninety years ago, in Frye v. United States,4 this demand was
recognized. The court stated that “[s]omewhere in this twilight zone
the evidential force of the principal must be recognized.”5 The Frye
court held that novel scientific evidence must be “generally
accepted” in its particular field to be admissible.6 Seventy years later,
the United States Supreme Court rejected Frye as the appropriate test
for federal courts and established the Daubert standard.7 This factorbased standard directs judges, as gatekeepers, to determine the
reliability and relevance of the testimony.8
Minnesota courts presently stand in opposition to the majority
of states, which have adopted the Daubert standard.9 Minnesota

1.

ARTHUR C. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LIMITS OF
34 (1961).
2. See generally Carl H. Hanson, When Science Is Too Daunting: Multiple Chemical
Sensitivity, Federal Courts, and the Struggling Spirit of Daubert, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 273
(2000) (discussing use of science in the courtroom and the troubles in applying
novel scientific evidence in Frye and Daubert hearings).
3. See generally Joseph M. Price & Gretchen Gates Kelly, Junk Science in the
Courtroom: Causes, Effects, and Controls, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 395 (1996) (explaining
the evolution of and current problem with junk science expert testimony).
4. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
5. Id. at 1014.
6. Id.
7. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993).
8. See id. at 597 (“We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the
judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from
learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance
that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic
understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.”).
9. See Heather G. Hamilton, Note, The Movement from Frye to Daubert: Where
Do the States Stand?, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 208–10 (1998) (discussing the aftermath
effect of Daubert in state courts).

THE POSSIBLE
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instead adheres to its own Frye-Mack test.10 However, amid continuing
controversy and partisan lobbying, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence is currently soliciting
input on whether to amend or abandon the Frye-Mack standard.11
Part II of this Note examines the history of the Frye and Daubert
standards, focusing on the evolution of Minnesota’s Frye-Mack
standard.12 Part III analyzes Minnesota’s Frye-Mack standard and
identifies areas in which Frye-Mack has been inconsistently applied.13
In Part IV, this Note considers possible changes to Frye-Mack.14 Part
V concludes that Minnesota courts would benefit from changes to
Frye-Mack that clarify its application while retaining its uniform and
deferential qualities.15
II. HISTORY
A.

Where It All Started: Frye v. United States

In 1923, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a trial court’s exclusion of polygraph evidence in a murder
trial.16 Finding the polygraph test insufficiently reliable, the court
crafted a “general acceptance” test to scrutinize the unrecognized
scientific methods.17 The test requires that “the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”18

10. See, e.g., Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000) (rejecting
Daubert and reaffirming adherence to the Frye-Mack standard).
11. Mike Mosedale, Is Frye-Mack Toast? Committee Mulls Shift to Daubert
Standard, MINN. LAW. (July 21, 2016), http://minnlawyer.com/2016/07/21/is-frye
-mack-toast-committee-mulls-shift-to-daubert-standard/.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). This case turned
on admissibility of the then-novel systolic blood pressure deception test, a
predecessor to the polygraph test. For a more in-depth explanation of Frye and
polygraph testing, see Vincent V. Vigluicci, Calculating Credibility: State v. Sharma
and the Future of Polygraph Admissibility in Ohio and Beyond, 42 AKRON L. REV. 319, 321–
22 (2009).
17. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
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Frye’s general acceptance test was initially unremarkable. Only
a few dozen published cases cited Frye from 1923 until the 1960s.19
Frye’s slow recognition is partially explained by the lack of novel
forensic breakthroughs during this period.20 Moreover, expert
scientific evidence during this time was not commonly used in civil
court proceedings.21 Its usage notwithstanding, the Frye general
acceptance standard controlled the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence for seventy years.22
In 1975, largely in response to the “federalization” of criminal
law,23 the Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated.24 Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 (FRE 702) applied to expert testimony
previously subject to the Frye standard.25 While FRE 702 made no
mention of Frye, this silence was not an express rejection of Frye.26

19. See David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the
General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 388 (2001).
20. Id. at 388–89.
21. Id. at 389. Courts did not apply Frye to a civil case until 1988 in a toxic tort
case. Id. at 391. Before 1988, Frye was applied in forensic science applications in
criminal trials. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye
v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205–06 (1980).
22. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993) (“In the
70 years since its formation in the Frye case, the ‘general acceptance’ test has been
the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence
at trial.”). However, beginning in the 1950s, the general acceptance standard
became controversial. Chief among critics was Professor Charles McCormick.
McCormick criticized Frye for not properly deciding issues of scientific fact and
instead advocated for a more lenient “relevancy” approach. See Bernstein, supra note
19, at 389 (discussing McCormick’s “relevancy” theory as a replacement for Frye).
23. Bernstein, supra note 19, at 390.
24. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. The Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, appointed by Chief Justice Earl
Warren in 1965, worked for more than ten years to draft the rules before the rules
were signed into law. Id.; see also Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2003 (1994) (describing the development
and enactment of the federal rules).
25. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as originally promulgated, read: “If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.” 88 Stat. at 1937.
26. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (“That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules
of Evidence does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on
the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence.”).
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During this period, the Frye test was applied more frequently and
with less uniformity.27
Because Frye still existed and differed from FRE 702’s
requirements, courts began to inconsistently apply the two standards
to scientific evidence.28 Some courts remained faithful to Frye, others
applied FRE 702, some applied a merged version of the two, and still
others applied a “relevancy” standard.29
In the mid-1980s, Frye was shaken by an increase in toxic tort
litigation.30 An influx of causation-focused civil cases that hinged on
the admissibility of expert witnesses triggered questions of Frye’s
applicability.31 In response to this problem and in addition to the
increase in novel scientific and technological methods,
disagreement on standards arose between and among federal and
state courts.32
B.

Where It All Changed: The Daubert Trilogy

The dispute between and among courts about the appropriate
standard for expert testimony prompted the United States Supreme
Court to step in.33 In the 1990s, the Court decided three causation-

27. See Giannelli, supra note 24, at 2004 (discussing the inconsistency with
which courts admitted evidence of voiceprint identifications, bite mark
comparisons, and hypnotically-refreshed testimony). Compare United States v.
Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rejecting voiceprint evidence for lack of
general acceptance under Frye), with United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.
1975) (admitting voiceprint evidence and rejecting Frye’s applicability).
28. Bernstein, supra note 19, at 389–90.
29. Id. at 390.
30. See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic
Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U.
L. REV. 643, 661, 669 (1992) (describing how the “Agent Orange” product liability
litigation expanded the scope of Frye’s concerns by acknowledging Frye’s relevance
to prove causation in tort injury cases).
31. See generally David Bernstein, Out of the Fryeing Pan and into the Fire: The
Expert Witness Problem in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 117 (1990) (discussing
the problems with admissibility of expert testimony in the face of an increase in
toxic tort litigation).
32. See Giannelli, supra note 24, at 2009–15 (discussing the various standards
for admissibility used by courts in the 1970s and 1980s and noting disagreement
between standards).
33. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993) (“In this
case we are called upon to determine the standard for admitting expert scientific
testimony in a federal trial.”).
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based tort cases that together permanently changed the landscape
of scientific expert testimony.34
In the 1993 case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,35
the United States Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflict
between Frye and FRE 702. The Court abandoned the Frye test,
holding that general acceptance is not required to admit scientific
evidence.36 The Court reasoned that FRE 702’s silence as to Frye was
grounds for rejecting the standard.37 The Court relied on the
language of the Federal Rules to craft a new test.38 The new “Daubert
standard” envisioned judges acting as gatekeepers in charge of
deciding admissibility of expert testimony based on principles of
reliability.39 To determine reliability, the Daubert standard directs
trial courts to consider non-exclusive and non-dispositive factors
including whether the theory or technique (1) can be tested, (2) has
been subjected to peer review or publication, (3) has a known or
potential rate of error, (4) has existing and maintained standards
controlling the technique’s operation, and (5) is generally accepted
within the relevant scientific community.40
In 1997, General Electric Co. v. Joiner reaffirmed and extended a
trial court’s broad discretion under Daubert by deeming “abuse of
discretion” the appropriate standard of review for admitting
scientific testimony.41 Joiner also allows courts to examine the
reliability of an expert’s reasoning process, not just the theory’s
general methodology.42 Two years later, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
extended the Daubert standard to all expert testimony, not just

34. See Hamilton, supra note 9, at 206–10 (1998) (discussing the evolution from
Frye to Daubert and the effect upon state courts after Daubert was decided).
35. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
36. Id. at 597.
37. Id. at 588–89.
38. Id. at 591–92.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 593–94. Notably, Frye’s general acceptance standard is incorporated
as a relevant factor in a Daubert analysis but, in contrast to Frye, is not a dispositive
factor. Id.
41. 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
42. See id. (“[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one
another. . . . A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered.” (citation omitted)).
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scientific testimony.43 Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire together
comprise the Daubert trilogy.44
Trial lawyers and judges reacted strongly to Daubert. Civil
plaintiff-side attorneys and criminal prosecutors—two sides
commonly seeking to admit expert testimony—expressed disdain for
Daubert.45 While Daubert was intended to further the “liberal thrust”
of the Federal Rules of Evidence,46 opponents forecasted that
Daubert’s discretionary and factor-based makeup was likely to cause
increased scrutiny of experts, inconsistent rulings, and an increase
in time and money47 spent fighting over the admissibility of expert
testimony.48 In contrast, those who supported Daubert found that
abandoning Frye was necessary to allow judges to apply a more

43. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
44. See David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States,
44 JURIMETRICS J. 351, 351–57 (2004) (discussing the Daubert trilogy’s development
and impact on Frye).
45. See Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law’s
Hubris, 43 EMORY L.J. 913, 923–24 (1994) (noting that prosecutors and plaintiffs’
attorneys—each representing real victims—support Frye because of their reliance
upon complete deference to the scientific community to decide admissibility of
controversial scientific methods). But see Paul M. Barrett, Justices Rule Against Business
in Evidence Case—Restrictive Standard for Use of Scientific Testimony in Trials Is Struck
Down, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1993, at A3 (describing Frye as a test widely used to
exclude scientific evidence from personal-injury and other trials).
46. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (quoting
Beach Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
47. In 2016, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon vetoed Senate Bill 591, which sought
to require that Missouri adopt Daubert. Hanna Nakano, Legal Experts Differ on Mo.
Governor’s Daubert Veto; Business Leader Says It Leaves Negative Mark on State, MADISONST. CLAIR REC. (July 14, 2016, 6:36 AM), http://madisonrecord.com/stories
/510958596-legal-experts-differ-on-mo-governor-s-daubert-veto-business-leader-says
-it-leaves-negative-mark-on-state. Nixon argued in his veto that Daubert was a
“complicated and costly procedure” that for victims would have “ma[de] it more
expensive—and perhaps cost prohibitive—to bring forward their claims.” Id.
48. Interview with Michael Weiner, Senior Partner, Yaeger & Weiner, in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 30, 2016) [hereinafter Weiner]. Product liability attorney
Michael Weiner outlined these perceived problems with Daubert. Id. Mr. Weiner
asserts that because the general acceptance test is more predictable and less
commonly at issue, a switch to Daubert opens the door for defense attorneys to fight
for exclusion of generally accepted expert testimony and for judges to weave
personal opinions or political views into determinations. Id. Mr. Weiner also stated
that Frye-Mack hearings, commonly held as pretrial motions in limine, are expensive
to argue and more difficult to prepare for if general acceptance is merely one factor
that a Daubert judge may consider. Id.
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flexible and comprehensive standard to ever-evolving scientific
advances while adhering to the updated Federal Rules of Evidence.49
Several studies dulled the sharp predictions made by Daubert
opponents. One study found no statistically significant difference in
the rates at which cases were removed to federal court between states
applying Daubert and those applying Frye.50 Another study found
“very little evidence that adoption of the Daubert trilogy ha[d] any
systematic effect on whom is offered as an expert in state court
disputes.”51 A third study found Daubert to have no impact on
admission rates of expert testimony in criminal cases at either the
trial or appellate court levels.52
Other studies have shown that Daubert had a more notable
effect. One study of Daubert found that civil defendants succeed in
excluding nearly two-thirds of plaintiffs’ proffered expert
testimony.53 Another study found an early increase in the frequency
with which challenged evidence is excluded54 and a corresponding
rise in the number of cases dismissed at the summary judgment
stage.55 This study posited that judges applying Daubert initially
applied increased scrutiny while executing their new gatekeeping

49. See generally Lorie S. Gildea, Sifting the Dross: Expert Witness Testimony in
Minnesota After the Daubert Trilogy, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 93, 105–10 (2000)
(arguing that Minnesota should abandon Frye-Mack in favor of Daubert).
50. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 511 (2005).
51. Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Does Anyone Get Stopped at the Gate? An
Empirical Assessment of the Daubert Trilogy in the States, 20 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 33
(2012).
52. Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 364
(2002).
53. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 108 (2000).
54. Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Evidence in
Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 251, 293
(2002) (finding that the percentage of challenged evidence excluded increased
from 55% between July 1991 and June 1993 to 71% between July 1996 and June
1997).
55. Id. at 296 (finding an increase in the frequency with which summary
judgment was granted when evidence was challenged from 21% between July 1989
and June 1993 to 48% between July 1995 and June 1997). Unlike the exclusion rates,
the rates of summary judgment grants were not found to have subsided by the late
1990s. Id. at 294. This change could be due to broader litigation trends, but Daubert
likely played a role in this occurrence. See id. at 295–96.
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duties56 but also found that the evidence exclusion rates receded
back to pre-Daubert levels by 1999.57
The increased scrutiny that initially occurred after Daubert may
tell a more relevant story than the nominal net effect on exclusion
rates. In examining the changes to attorney practices in federal civil
cases post-Daubert, one study found that Daubert “appears to have
encouraged [federal judges and attorneys] to take a more active role
in scrutinizing proffered testimony.”58 For example, post-Daubert,
attorneys were more likely to have retained experts, scrutinized
expert credentials, and become more involved in testimony
preparation.59 Correspondingly, more motions in limine to exclude
experts were filed post-Daubert, and, if exclusion was granted,
summary judgment motions often followed.60 These findings
support the conclusion that Daubert courts apply a stricter scrutiny to
proffered expert testimony, which is precisely the argument against
Daubert made by lawyers seeking to retain the objectivity inherent in
Frye.61
In the first four years after Daubert, thirty-three states adopted
Daubert or a comparable standard.62 Additionally, Daubert prompted
all states to acknowledge that novel scientific testimony was subject
to a Frye or Daubert test in civil cases, not just criminal cases.63 As of
2001, the relevant standards used by states broke down
approximately as follows: twenty-nine states applied Daubert or a
similar test; six states applied the Daubert factors but did not reject
Frye; sixteen states and the District of Columbia adhered to Frye or a
similar test; and four states followed other standards.64 Since 2001,

56. Id. at 298.
57. Id. at 293.
58. Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns
Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 330
(2002).
59. See id. at 329.
60. Id.
61. Weiner, supra note 48.
62. Hamilton, supra note 9, at 209.
63. Bernstein, supra note 19, at 394–95 (“After Daubert, no state has explicitly
held that Frye is not applicable to evidence in products liability and toxic tort
cases.”).
64. Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of
Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 (2001).
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several other states have accepted Daubert or a similar test, limiting
Frye adherents to a slim minority.65
C.

Minnesota’s Standard
1.

Pre-Goeb

Minnesota originally applied Frye to scientific expert
testimony.66 In 1977, Minnesota adopted its own rules of evidence.67
Minnesota’s rules were modeled after the Federal Rules and
included an identical version of FRE 702.68 Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 702 (MRE 702) did not mention Frye or its general
acceptance test; its focus was on ensuring witness qualification and
assisting triers of fact in formulating correct resolutions.69
Three years after the Minnesota Rules were codified, the
Minnesota Supreme Court decided State v. Mack.70 In Mack, the court
excluded testimony based on hypnotically refreshed recollection
testimony under Frye but added a layer to the Frye standard by
requiring that the proffered expert testimony “meet ordinary
standards of reliability for admission.”71 Thus, Minnesota’s test
became two-pronged: first, novel scientific evidence must be
65. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. EVID. 702; FLA. R. EVID. 90.702; MISS. R. EVID. 702; Motorola,
Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 752 (D.C. 2016) (overturning Frye over ninety years
after deciding it).
66. See State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 220–21, 52 N.W.2d 458, 465 (1952).
67. Order Promulgating the Rules of Evidence (Minn. Apr. 1, 1977),
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/AdministrativeFileArchive/Rules
%20of%20Evidence%20ADM10-8047%20(formerly%20C3-84-2138)/1977-04-01
-Order-Amending-Rls-of-Evid.pdf. The Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory
Committee, which consisted of a variety of state judges and practitioners, drafted
and proposed the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. Id. The preliminary comments to
these Rules stated, “Unless there was a substantial state policy which required
deviation from the federal rule, the committee recommended the federal rule of
evidence exactly as enacted.” Preliminary Comment, Order Promulgating Rules of
Evidence
Rule
Commentary
(Minn.
Apr.
4,
1977),
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/AdministrativeFileArchive/Rules
%20of%20Evidence%20ADM10-8047%20(formerly%20C3-84-2138)/1976-12-08
%20Rls%20of%20Evid%20Proposed%20Amend.pdf.
68. Penelope Harley, Minnesota Decides: Goeb v. Tharaldson and the Admissibility
of Novel Scientific Evidence, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 460, 492 (2001).
69. MINN. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s comment to 1977 Order
Promulgating the Rules of Evidence.
70. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
71. Id. at 772.
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generally accepted in its relevant scientific community,72 and
second, the evidence must have foundational reliability.73
In the first years after Daubert was decided, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals heard a number of cases that required choosing between
Daubert and Frye.74 However, because the Minnesota Supreme Court
possessed the sole authority to amend the rules of evidence and had
reaffirmed Frye as recently as 1989,75 the Minnesota Court of Appeals
declined to apply Daubert in these cases.76 Into the late 1990s,
Minnesota courts remained largely faithful to Frye-Mack without any
express rejection of Daubert.77
2.

The Goeb Decision

In 2000, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether to
abandon Frye in favor of Daubert.78 The case, Goeb v. Tharaldson, was a
toxic tort battle hinging on causation, much like Daubert.79 After
becoming ill from an insecticide, the plaintiffs filed suit against the
insecticide’s manufacturer and applier.80 At trial, the plaintiffs
sought to introduce expert testimony to substantiate their causation
argument.81 The district court granted the defendants’ motion to
72. See State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 97–98 (Minn. 1990).
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., K.B. v. Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am., 538 N.W.2d 152, 157
n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)
(noting that Daubert’s persuasive force in Minnesota may be strengthened by the
fact that Minnesota Rules of Evidence are modeled after the federal rules); State v.
Goldstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 342 n.5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
75. See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1989) (citing Frye-Mack’s
more objective and uniform rulings as justification for adhering to the standard).
76. See Alt, 504 N.W.2d at 46 (“It is for our supreme court, not this court, to
decide Daubert’s impact in Minnesota.”).
77. See, e.g., Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 812 (Minn. 2000) (noting
that Minnesota courts have, to date, refused to abandon Frye-Mack); State v.
Hodgson, 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn. 1994) (acknowledging Daubert’s repudiation of
Frye in the federal sphere but refusing to address Daubert’s relevance in Minnesota
law). But see Fairview Hosp. & Health Care Servs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
535 N.W.2d 337, 340 n.4 (Minn. 1995) (implying that Daubert was applicable in the
court’s analysis of expert testimony); State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159, 161–64 (Minn.
1994) (applying a Daubert-style reliability test to determine admissibility of DNA
evidence).
78. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 809.
79. Id. at 803–05.
80. Id. at 805.
81. Id.
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exclude the expert testimony because, under Frye-Mack, the expert’s
methodologies were neither generally accepted nor reliable.82
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis in Goeb acknowledged
Frye-Mack’s criticisms. First, the court stated that the general
acceptance standard may wrongly “exclude cutting-edge but
otherwise demonstrably reliable, probative evidence.”83 Second, the
court recognized that Frye-Mack “improperly defers to scientists the
legal question of admissibility of scientific evidence.”84 Third, the
court noted that Frye-Mack fails to define the “relevant scientific
community” and fails to define or quantify general acceptance.85
Finally, the court conceded that adhering to Frye-Mack prevents
uniformity with the Federal Rules of Evidence.86
Nonetheless, the Goeb court combatted these criticisms and
reaffirmed Frye-Mack.87 The court first noted that no significant
advancements in Minnesota case law or Rules of Evidence suggest
any problem with Frye-Mack sufficient to justify a change.88 Next, the
court expressed concern that Daubert, by allowing judges substantial
discretion, would lead to inconsistent district court rulings only
correctable if abuse of discretion is proven.89 The court believed that
this discretion to decide disputes between qualified scientists on
complex scientific issues was beyond the proper scope of judicial
authority or capability.90 Ultimately, seeking objective and uniform
rulings and seeing little problem with Minnesota’s status quo, the
court in Goeb rejected Daubert and reaffirmed adherence to FryeMack.91

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 808–09.
Id. at 812.
Id.
Id. at 813.
See id.
Id. at 814.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 813.
Id. at 814.
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Post-Goeb

Many of the initial cases following Goeb worked to determine
thresholds for general acceptance92 and foundational reliability.93
This struggle was not new; the same struggles were aptly articulated
over eighty years prior when the Frye Court observed, “Just when a
scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized . . . .”94
Additionally, Minnesota courts worked to determine which
types of scientific evidence remained “novel” and which standard was
appropriate for “non-novel” evidence. For example, in State v.
MacLennan,95 the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed whether to
apply Frye-Mack to social science evidence about battered child
syndrome.96 The court distinguished social science evidence, which
explains an individual’s behavior, from physical science evidence,
which instead involves a test or diagnosis.97 This distinction led the
court to apply a standard MRE 702 analysis instead of Frye-Mack.98
In 2006, the Minnesota Supreme Court amended MRE 702 to
codify Goeb.99 The language of MRE 702 made the Mack foundational
reliability prong applicable to all expert testimony but limited the
Frye general acceptance prong to “opinion or evidence involv[ing]
novel scientific theory.”100 In doing so, the court intentionally
declined to define what constituted reliable foundation, novel
92. Compare State v. Traylor, 656 N.W.2d 885, 893 (Minn. 2003) (deeming the
PCR-STR method of testing DNA to clearly be generally accepted and reasoning
that decisions of other jurisdictions are relevant to a Frye-Mack analysis), with State
v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 821–23 (Minn. 2002) (holding that the PCR-STR
method is not generally accepted simply because other courts have ruled it so and
is thus considered a novel scientific technique subject to a Frye-Mack test).
93. Compare State v. Bailey, 677 N.W.2d 380, 399–400 (Minn. 2004) (holding
insufficient the trial court’s conclusion that DNA results were foundationally
reliable based on the DNA Advisory Board standards), with Traylor, 656 N.W.2d at
897 (holding that the DNA Advisory Board standards are appropriate for judging
foundational reliability of DNA testing).
94. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
95. 702 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 2005).
96. Id. at 230–33.
97. Id. at 232–33.
98. Id. at 233.
99. See MINN. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment.
100. MINN. R. EVID. 702.
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scientific evidence, or general acceptance.101 Courts acknowledged
this rule change and ignored the general acceptance prong when
the technique producing the evidence was no longer considered
novel.102 In 2007, the court clarified that novel scientific evidence
under MRE 702 applies only to “evidence based on emerging
scientific techniques.”103
In 2011, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Obeta,104
outlined a version of Minnesota’s then-current standard for
admitting expert testimony: (1) the witness must be qualified as an
expert, (2) the expert’s opinion must have foundational reliability,
(3) the expert testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact, and (4)
the testimony must satisfy the Frye-Mack test if it involves a novel
scientific theory.105 Prong four, as articulated by Goeb, is itself twopronged. Prong four requires that the proponent of expert
testimony premised on a novel scientific technique establish that,
first, the theory or technique is generally accepted in the relevant
scientific field, and, second, “the test itself is reliable and that its
administration in the particular instance conformed to the
procedure necessary to ensure reliability.”106
Obeta’s standard caused confusion by discussing foundational
reliability in parts two and four of the test.107 In 2012, the Minnesota
Supreme Court attempted to clarify this discrepancy in Doe v.
Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis.108 In Doe, the plaintiff argued
that the district court erred by applying the Frye-Mack foundational
reliability test to evidence of repressed memory instead of a general

101. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000) (“Further,
because the law is continuously evolving, answers to these questions will be set forth
in case law as the issues properly present themselves.”); see also MINN. R. EVID. 702
advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment.
102. See, e.g., State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 103–04 (Minn. 2010); State v. Roman
Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn. 2002).
103. Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 528 (Minn. 2007)
(quoting State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 419 (Minn. 1992)).
104. 796 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 2011).
105. Id. at 289.
106. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000) (citing State v.
Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1990)). But see State v. Hill, 871 N.W.2d 900, 904
n.3 (Minn. 2015) (holding that Frye-Mack applies to all scientific evidence, not just
novel techniques, but that the focus should be on the foundational reliability prong
if general acceptance is not at issue).
107. See Obeta, 796 N.W.2d at 289.
108. 817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012).
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foundational reliability test.109 The court avoided deciding whether
Frye-Mack was appropriate110 and instead concluded that the district
court’s Frye-Mack foundational reliability test was substantially the
same as the foundational reliability test articulated in MRE 702.111
Since Doe in 2012, the Minnesota Supreme Court has made no major
changes to Frye-Mack.112
III. ANALYSIS: UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS WITH FRYE-MACK
This Note analyzes Minnesota court decisions to identify and
explain three presently unresolved questions with Frye-Mack: (1)
what constitutes a novel scientific theory,113 (2) what is general
acceptance,114 and (3) what is the proper analysis under the
foundational reliability prong.115 This analysis seeks to highlight
evolving inconsistencies with the Frye-Mack standard for admitting
expert testimony.116

109. Id. at 166.
110. Id. at 165 (“[I]f we conclude that the district court properly excluded Doe’s
evidence under one of the first three parts of [MRE 702], we need not consider
whether the theory of repressed and recovered memory is subject to the Frye-Mack
standard.”). But see id. at 178 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the court of
appeals that Frye-Mack is not the appropriate analytical framework for evaluating the
admissibility of the proffered expert testimony).
111. See id. at 169 (majority opinion) (“Nominally, the district court conducted
a Frye-Mack foundational reliability analysis, but its conclusions and findings on the
theory . . . were a de facto Rule 702 analysis.”).
112. However, in 2015, the Minnesota Supreme Court articulated yet another
iteration of Frye-Mack. In State v. Hill, the court made no mention of the “novel”
requirement. 871 N.W.2d 900, 904 n.3 (Minn. 2015). Instead, the court stated that
when general acceptance is conceded, courts must focus on the second prong,
which requires proof “that the generally accepted methodology ‘produced reliable
results in the specific case.’” Id. (quoting State v. Bailey, 677 N.W.2d 380, 397–98
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004)).
113. See infra Section III.A.
114. See infra Section III.B.
115. See infra Section III.C.
116. MINN. R. EVID. 702 is titled “Testimony by Experts,” but its language also
includes references to “opinion” and “evidence.” Case law has followed this pattern.
Accordingly, this Note uses expert “evidence,” “testimony,” and “opinion”
interchangeably to refer to subject matter governed by Frye-Mack or MRE 702.
Moreover, because so much of Frye-Mack and MRE 702’s effect is felt at the trial court
level, this analysis will discuss several published and unpublished district court and
appellate court decisions that are not themselves precedential.
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What Is Novel Scientific Theory Under MRE 702?

Frye’s general acceptance requirement for novel expert
testimony was intended, in part, to guard against junk science.117
Science is complex, fast-evolving, and full of genuine disagreement
on the validity of methodologies and conclusions upon which judges
and juries heavily rely.118 Experts can now be retained to support a
party’s position on almost any issue.119 Controversial theories to
support expert opinions are commonplace.120 Some of these
controversial theories are newly-developed, others have long been
controversial, but all present problems for a judge who is
uneducated on the subject matter.121 How can a court balance
helpful expert testimony against the risk of admitting unreliable
expert testimony? Frye answers this question by distinguishing novel
scientific theory from non-novel theory, requiring general
acceptance of the former but not the latter.122 Naturally, the
question becomes: what is novel?
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 plainly limits the general
acceptance requirement to opinions or evidence involving novel
scientific theory.123 A finding of novel scientific theory, then, is a
prerequisite to analysis of general acceptance.124 In Frye, the court
created this “novel” label to describe the lack of precedent regarding
admissibility of the scientific technique at issue.125 The Frye court also
noted that the “novel” label describes the newness of the

117. See generally Price & Kelly, supra note 3 (examining the problem of and
possible solutions to junk science in the courtroom).
118. See Hanson, supra note 2, at 286.
119. See David Sonenshein & Charles Fitzpatrick, The Problem of Partisan Experts
and the Potential for Reform Through Concurrent Evidence, 32 REV. LITIG. 1, 3–15 (2013)
(discussing the use of scientific experts in the courtroom and the related problem
of bias).
120. Id. at 25 (discussing the controversial nature of litigation-driven research).
121. See Milich, supra note 45, at 924–26.
122. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 809 (Minn. 2000).
123. MINN. R. EVID. 702. (“[I]f the opinion or evidence involves novel scientific
theory, the proponent must establish that the underlying scientific evidence is
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.”).
124. See id.
125. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“Counsel for
defendant, in their able presentation of the novel question involved, correctly state
in their brief that no cases directly in point have been found.”).
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technique.126 Novel stems from the theory’s lack of precedent and
lack of proven validity.127
Minnesota has long applied its own Frye-Mack standard, which is
intended to help judges make uniform decisions by letting the
scientific community determine the theory’s scientific merit.128
While Frye-Mack judges are to rely on scientists to decide the
acceptance and reliability of the science, it is up to judges to make
the initial determination that the scientific theory at issue is novel
and thus subject to Frye-Mack.129 This undertaking can be broken
down into two interrelated but separable questions: (1) what is novel,
and (2) what is scientific theory.
1.

What Is Novel Under MRE 702?

The comments to the 2006 amendment to MRE 702 state that
“[t]he rule does not define what is novel, leaving this for resolution
by the courts.”130 In 2007, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
Frye-Mack applies to “evidence based on emerging scientific
techniques.”131 Minnesota courts have not clarified when techniques
are no longer emerging or novel, but have commonly applied two
approaches.
The first approach to analyzing the applicability of Frye-Mack is
to use “general acceptance” as the standard for judging whether a
technique is novel. Zandi v. Wyeth illustrates this approach.132 In
Zandi, the plaintiff sought to introduce into evidence the results of a
rarely used test to prove that the defendant pharmaceutical
company’s hormone therapy caused the plaintiff’s breast cancer.133
The court reasoned that the test was novel because the test was

126. Id. (“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.”).
127. See id.
128. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000).
129. See State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2002) (holding that
a pretrial hearing on the first Frye-Mack prong is needed unless the court has
reviewed and confirmed the evidence’s general acceptance).
130. MINN. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment.
131. Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 528 (Minn. 2007)
(quoting State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 419 (Minn. 1992)).
132. No. 27-CV-06-6744, 2007 WL 3224242 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 15, 2007).
133. See id. at *4, *8.
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“clearly not generally accepted in the scientific community for the
purpose for which it is here proffered.”134
This approach makes a judge’s determination more objective.135
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 implies a two-step approach: (1)
determine whether a novel scientific theory is at issue, and if so, (2)
analyze general acceptance.136 Using general acceptance as the
threshold for novelty may save a step in this analysis. If a judge is
asked whether a technique is novel and it is not clear, then
determining that the technique is generally accepted answers
questions steps one and two simultaneously. If no instructive
precedent guides the “novel” determination but the evidence
arguably triggers Frye-Mack, then diving into general acceptance is
the logical solution.
However, this approach creates confusion. Essentially, MRE 702
and Frye-Mack ask “the question: When is a novel scientific test not a
novel scientific test[?]”137 Under the above analysis, “the answer is:
when it is ‘generally accepted.’”138 However, this approach ignores
the language in MRE 702. The first question being asked in Frye-Mack
under MRE 702 is whether the opinion or evidence involves a novel
scientific theory.139 The answer to this question matters. If yes, then
the proponent must prove general acceptance,140 an expensive
endeavor typically requiring the proponent to hire more experts.141
If not, then the proponent need only prove the other MRE 702
requirements.142 But, if the court conflates novelty with general

134. Id. at *23; see also Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. 62-C906-003962, 2009 WL 5576242, at *2 n.1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 8, 2009) (ruling that
repressed memory research was subject to Frye-Mack because it “has never been
scrutinized under the Frye-Mack standard as being generally accepted within the
relevant scientific community”), rev’d, 801 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d,
817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012).
135. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000).
136. MINN. R. EVID. 702.
137. Amicus Curiae Brief for Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association at 38, Goeb
v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000) (No. CX-98-2275), 1999 MN S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 3, at *38.
138. Id.
139. MINN. R. EVID. 702.
140. See id.
141. See 11 PETER N. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: EVIDENCE § 703.04
(4th ed. 2016) (noting that Frye-Mack hearings are expensive and time consuming
for parties involved).
142. See id. (scrutinizing the expert opinion for foundational reliability).
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acceptance, then the language in MRE 702 becomes less meaningful
and the evidence rightly subject to Frye-Mack becomes less clear.
A second approach used by lower courts to define novelty is to
rely on Minnesota appellate court precedent. Under this approach,
a technique is no longer novel, and thus no Frye-Mack hearing is
required, once Minnesota’s appellate courts “ha[ve] reviewed and
confirmed the general acceptance of a scientific technique.”143 Trial
courts define this inquiry narrowly: if general acceptance has not
been expressly confirmed for the precise technique at issue, then the
technique remains novel.144 For example, in State v. Edstrom,145 the
Minnesota Court of Appeals found a Frye-Mack hearing necessary
despite acceptance and admission of the scientific technique in
other contexts.146 Similarly, the trial court in Peterson v. Progressive
Contractors, Inc.147 stated that “[a] technique may be considered
‘novel’ if it differs from older techniques and has never been
considered by the appellate courts.”148

143. State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2002). The court in
Roman Nose discredited the State’s argument that general acceptance in other
jurisdictions is sufficient to deem the evidence not novel in Minnesota courts. Id. at
820–22. The court stated that this approach “would be a departure from our
precedent requiring a Frye-Mack hearing to determine general acceptance within
the relevant scientific community.” Id. at 820. However, courts have also struggled
when the technique does not plainly appear to be novel in any sense but has yet to
be ruled so by Minnesota courts. For example, in State v. Edwards, the court was
tasked with interpreting whether gunshot residue evidence was generally accepted.
See No. 55-K4-06-414, 2006 WL 6626516, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 7, 2006)
(explaining that a Frye-Mack hearing was held on the admissibility of the gunshot
residue during the court trial). Without any express Frye-Mack precedent on the
technique at issue, the court excluded the evidence based on precedent from other
jurisdictions and a 1974 Minnesota Supreme Court general discussion of the
technique. Id. at *2–9.
144. See Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d at 822 (holding that general acceptance of one
method of DNA testing does not provide proper justification to conclude general
acceptance of a sufficiently different technique of DNA testing).
145. 792 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
146. Id. at 110 (holding that, while the scientific technique at issue, gas
headspace chromatography, had been admitted and analyzed by previous
Minnesota courts in other contexts and was arguably not novel, there was no district
court error in finding the evidence novel); see also State v. Zanter, No. K3-00-1789,
2002 WL 34437339, at *5 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 2002) (involving “the novel
question of whether mitochondrial DNA identification evidence is admissible in
Minnesota courts”).
147. No. 71-CV-07-1295, 2008 WL 8487936 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2008).
148. Id. (citing Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d at 821).
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This precedent-based approach, by definition, relies on
appellate courts to rule on a case’s merits to create precedent upon
which lower courts can rely. District court findings are not
sufficient.149 Unfortunately, Minnesota’s high courts have neglected
this duty on occasion.150 Justice Meyer recognized that the
Minnesota Supreme Court “do[es] a disservice to district courts and
the administration of criminal justice in this state by declining to
decide the issue on its merits.”151 Because lower courts rely so greatly
on precedent, appellate courts’ failure to rule on case merits may
result in scientific techniques remaining novel until a subsequent
determination is made. This may lead to more Frye-Mack hearings on
the same purportedly novel theories, resulting in less uniform
decisions and increased expense.152 Because Goeb emphasized
uniformity as justification for retaining Frye-Mack,153 this presents
cause for concern.
2.

What Is Scientific Theory Under MRE 702?

The question of novelty differs slightly from the problem of
determining what categories of testimony are scientific under MRE
702 and Frye-Mack. “A Frye-Mack hearing is only necessary when the
149. The dissent in Roman Nose recognized this, stating that the majority ignored
three recent district court findings of general acceptance when it instead required
a hearing unless the supreme court has confirmed the scientific technique. 649
N.W.2d at 824–25 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
150. See, e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150, 165
(Minn. 2012) (“Therefore, if we conclude that the district court properly excluded
Doe’s evidence under one of the first three parts of [MRE 702], we need not
consider whether the theory of repressed and recovered memory is subject to the
Frye-Mack standard.”); State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 294 n.9 (Minn. 2011) (“We
express no opinion on whether a Frye-Mack hearing is necessary in order to admit
expert testimony on typical rape-victim behaviors.”); State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91,
104 (Minn. 2010) (refusing to rule on the admissibility of fingerprint evidence
under Frye-Mack because any error committed in admitting the evidence was
harmless).
151. Hull, 788 N.W.2d. at 108 (Meyer, J., concurring); see also Jacobson v.
$55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 534 (Minn. 2007) (Hanson, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he court did not address the issue relevant to a Frye-Mack test,
namely, whether the theories . . . were generally accepted in the scientific
community.”).
152. See 11 THOMPSON, supra note 141 (noting that courts’ refusal to decide
issues on the merits may cause an increase in time-consuming and expensive FryeMack hearings).
153. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000).
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evidence at issue was obtained using a technique that is both scientific
and novel.”154 The Minnesota Supreme Court has referred to
“scientific” evidence under MRE 702 as evidence based on a
“scientific process, principle, technique or device.”155
The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished scientific
evidence from traditional expert testimony due to its potential to
mislead triers of fact uneducated in science.156 In State v.
MacLennan,157 the court accurately described this dilemma by
deeming a Frye test “appropriate when the experimental, mechanical
or theoretical nature of the scientific evidence ha[s] the potential to
mislead lay jurors awed by an aura of mystic infallibility surrounding
scientific techniques, experts and the fancy devices employed.”158
This background guides analysis of two related questions. First, what
is to be done with testimony that is not “scientific” in a traditional
sense? Second, does the purpose for which the testimony is being
proffered change Frye-Mack’s applicability?
In answering question one, courts find no guidance from Goeb
or MRE 702.159 The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that FryeMack is inapplicable when no variety of physical or “hard science” is
involved.160 Examples of non-scientific theories include drug dogsniffs,161 ten-point gang identification criteria,162 and parenting
assessments in child protection matters.163 Courts have also held
arguably scientific evidence to not trigger Frye-Mack if what is truly
being challenged is a formula, calculation, or process. Examples
include expert testimony regarding retrograde extrapolation
mathematical formulas,164 use of an amount of electrical resistance
154. State v. Edstrom, 702 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis
added) (citing State v. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d 577, 585 (Minn. 1994)).
155. Jacobson, 728 N.W.2d at 529 (quoting State v. Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312, 1320
(Ariz. 1984)).
156. See Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 812–13.
157. 702 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 2005).
158. Id. at 232 (quoting State v. Borrelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1110 (Conn. 1993)).
159. See MINN. R. EVID. 702 (applicable to all scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge); Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 814 (holding Frye-Mack applicable to
novel scientific theories).
160. Jacobson, 728 N.W.2d at 528–29.
161. Id.
162. State v. Deshay, 645 N.W.2d 185, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding tenpoint gang identification criteria to not be scientific in a Frye-Mack sense).
163. In re Welfare of the Children of S.E.N. & R.D.J., Jr., No. A15-2009, 2016 WL
2946278, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).
164. State v. Jensen, 482 N.W.2d 238, 239 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
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on a dairy cow,165 and the process of converting an analog signal into
a digital signal.166
Unlike traditional scientific theory involving physical scientific
tests, social science theories and research techniques have clumsily
been subject to Frye-Mack.167 In 1991, the Minnesota Supreme Court
declined to decide whether expert psychological testimony should
be examined under Frye-Mack.168 Later, the court in MacLennan
declined to categorize expert testimony on battered child syndrome
as a scientific theory, stating that “expert testimony on syndromes,
unlike DNA evidence or other physical science, is not the type of
evidence that the analytic framework established by Frye-Mack was
designed to address.”169 Conversely, the court earlier held that
hypnotically refreshed testimony was subject to Frye, despite not
being mechanical or scientific in nature.170
In answering question two—whether the purpose for which the
evidence is proffered has any bearing on admissibility—there is a
similar lack of instruction from Minnesota precedent. The
MacLennan court drew a distinction between “scientific evidence
derived from a specific test or diagnosis and expert testimony that
offers an explanation for a person’s behavior.”171 The court stated
that experts testifying about a scientific theory to help a jury
understand conduct differs from testimony regarding physical
science being used to prove whether a party suffers from a
condition.172 While the MacLellan court fell on the side of admitting
syndrome evidence,173 the supreme court has also excluded
165. Poppler v. Wright Hennepin Coop. Elec. Ass’n, 834 N.W.2d 527, 541
(Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (clarifying that the expert’s use of 200 ohms “is the result of
scientific tests applying scientific techniques that are based on scientific theory,” but
is not itself a scientific theory).
166. State v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 716, 722 (Minn. 2007).
167. See State v. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 230 n.2 (Minn. 2005).
168. State v. Kraushaar, 470 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Minn. 1991).
169. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d. at 233. Courts have likewise not applied Frye-Mack
to battered woman’s syndrome evidence. See, e.g., State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d
189 (Minn. 1997) (allowing battered woman’s syndrome evidence to explain a
victim’s delay in reporting the crime); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn.
1989) (allowing the evidence to prove self-defense); State v. Plantin, 682 N.W.2d
653 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (allowing the evidence to assist a jury in understanding
a victim’s justification for recanting a story).
170. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980).
171. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d at 232–33.
172. Id.
173. The MacLennan court said that while syndrome evidence was admissible, it
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syndrome evidence being offered to explain a condition if the
evidence is not necessary for the jury to decide the dispute.174
This distinction regarding the testimony’s purpose was again
addressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Doe v. Archdiocese of St.
Paul & Minneapolis.175 In Doe, the plaintiffs sought to introduce
experts solely to explain the general condition of repressed memory
to help the jury understand the victim’s conduct and testimony.176
The experts were not intending to testify that the plaintiff suffered
from repressed memory syndrome but to assist the trier of fact in its
determinations.177 The court acknowledged this distinction in its
foundational reliability analysis but declined to address whether the
fact that the testimony was limited to general background had any
bearing on the appropriate standard to be used.178
In contrast to Minnesota courts, federal courts governed by
Daubert need not wrestle with questions of novelty or scientific
theory. Kumho Tire rendered these distinctions irrelevant by
extending Daubert’s applicability to all expert testimony.179 The
Supreme Court recognized that “no clear line” distinguishes
scientific evidence from other specialized knowledge in a way that is
capable of application in particular cases.180 This recognition
highlights the difficulty in requiring a court using Frye to determine
whether a novel scientific theory is at issue before applying the
general acceptance test.181
The lack of guidance on how a court must determine whether
expert testimony is subject to Frye-Mack is problematic. In cases
also had to be relevant. Id. at 230. While the supreme court found that the district
court erred in applying the Frye-Mack standard, the supreme court then turned to
whether there was reversible error and found that the proof MacLellan submitted
did “not support the admission of the expert testimony on battered child
syndrome.” Id. at 234–35.
174. See State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982) (“Rape trauma
syndrome is not a fact-finding tool, but a therapeutic tool [which] does not assist
the jury in its fact-finding function . . . .”).
175. See Respondent’s Brief and Addendum, Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul &
Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150 (2012) (No. A10-1951), 2011 WL 8815649, at *20 (“In
the case of behavioral or social science testimony that is offered to explain certain
conduct, . . . the Frye test is inapplicable to such evidence.”).
176. Id. at *17–18.
177. Id. at *17.
178. See Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d at 168.
179. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999).
180. Id. at 148.
181. See id.
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involving social science or syndrome evidence, the lack of guidance
is particularly problematic—evidence is needed to explain behavior
that could otherwise appear irrational to a juror.182 If Minnesota
desires to retain Frye-Mack, then the Minnesota Supreme Court
would best achieve Frye-Mack’s goals by articulating a standard under
which trial courts could more consistently decide to which testimony
Frye-Mack applies.183
B.

What Is General Acceptance Under MRE 702?

For opinions or evidence involving novel scientific theory, “the
proponent must establish that the underlying scientific evidence is
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.”184 The general
acceptance requirement for novel scientific theory represents a
principal difference between Frye-Mack and Daubert. In Frye-Mack,
general acceptance, if required, is dispositive (i.e., failure to prove
general acceptance is fatal to any expert testimony that the court
finds to involve a novel scientific theory).185 Conversely, under
Daubert, general acceptance is merely one factor that may bear on
admissibility.186
Goeb stated that Frye-Mack’s general acceptance requirement
“ensures that the persons most qualified to assess the scientific
validity of a technique have the determinative voice.”187 Instead of
forcing judges to become amateur scientists,188 judges under FryeMack defer to the relevant scientific community to gauge whether
the theory’s acceptance has reached the necessary threshold.189
Despite ultimately reaffirming Frye-Mack, the Goeb court recognized
three potentially problematic questions left unanswered in a FryeMack test: (1) whether the court must look to general acceptance of
the technique or of the underlying scientific principle, (2) who is the
relevant scientific community, and (3) what threshold meets general
182. See Peter B. Knapp, The Other Shoe Drops: Minnesota Rejects Daubert, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 997, 1022 (2000) (noting the need to articulate a standard for
admissibility of “social framework” testimony).
183. See id.
184. MINN. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added).
185. See id.
186. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
187. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000).
188. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
189. See Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 813.
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acceptance.190 This Note will address each of these question in turn
to analyze whether courts since Goeb have provided any useful
answers.
1.

General Acceptance of What?

Frye initially required general acceptance of the technique and
the underlying theory.191 Later, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated
that general acceptance applies to the scientific technique or
principle at issue.192 The court also stated that scientific testing is not
a prerequisite for proving general acceptance,193 implying that
general acceptance of the underlying theory or principle, rather
than the scientific test itself, may suffice. The court has also
described the general acceptance prong as asking “whether experts
in the field widely share the view that the results of the scientific
testing are scientifically reliable.”194 These interpretations subtly but
significantly vary and together reveal the difficulty in determining
what precisely must be generally accepted under Frye-Mack.
In Zandi v. Wyeth,195 the trial court demanded that a very narrow
proposition be generally accepted.196 The scientific theory being
proffered was that the defendant’s hormone therapy caused the
plaintiff’s breast cancer.197 The plaintiff, seeking to prove general
acceptance of the underlying scientific theory, introduced a
multitude of corroborating studies and the results of a differential
diagnosis.198 While the plaintiff argued that the studies showed longterm hormone therapy to be the predominant cause of breast
cancer, the court was not convinced.199 In holding the studies
insufficient to prove general acceptance, the court articulated the
specific deficiency in the plaintiff’s argument:
190. Id.
191. See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir. 1975).
192. Sentinel Mgmt. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 615 N.W.2d 819, 824 (Minn.
2000).
193. Id. at 827.
194. State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn. 2002).
195. No. 27-CV-06-6744, 2007 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 12 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 15,
2007), aff’d, No. A08-1455, 2009 WL 2151141 (Minn. Ct. App. July 21, 2009).
196. See id. at *12.
197. See id. at *3.
198. See id. at *13.
199. See id. at *20–21 (“[T]he Court can find no support for the proposition that
[hormone therapy] is the ‘predominant cause’ of breast cancer in a woman who has
taken [hormone therapy] for 17 years.”).
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[T]he “thing from which the deduction is made” is the
proposition that [hormone therapy] causes breast cancer;
the “deduction” which is made from the “thing” is the
conclusion that [hormone therapy] caused Plaintiff’s
particular cancer. . . . [E]ven if Plaintiff could show that the
“thing from which the deduction is made” was generally
accepted in the scientific community, Plaintiff’s
proposition is not a “thing” from which to make the
deduction the Doctors propose to make.
In this case, the “thing” from which the Doctors could
deduce the probable cause of Plaintiff’s cancer would be a
scientific methodology allowing a doctor to determine, in
hindsight, the likely causes of breast cancer in an individual
woman. Plaintiff has provided no evidence of any such
methodology.200
In Zandi, then, the district court required that the specific
proposition on which the plaintiff’s argument relied be generally
accepted, not the general underlying scientific theory.201 On appeal,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, stating that
“Zandi fail[ed] to demonstrate that there is a method for diagnosing
the cause of an individual’s breast cancer that is generally accepted
in the relevant scientific community.”202
In contrast, a set of cases very similar to Zandi, collectively titled
In re Prempro Products Liability Litigation v. Wyeth,203 was argued under
Daubert. At a bellwether trial, the federal district court found the
defendants liable for the plaintiff’s breast cancer and awarded the
plaintiff compensatory damages.204 The district court applied Daubert
to admit testimony from the plaintiff’s expert witness to support

200. Id. at *36–38.
201. Telephone Interview with Stuart L. Goldenberg, Senior Partner,
Goldenberg Law (Oct. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Goldenberg]. Product liability
attorney Stuart Goldenberg described how Zandi has affected the way judges apply
Frye-Mack. Mr. Goldenberg stated that civil defense attorneys occasionally cite to
Zandi to argue that Frye-Mack should exclude any causation-dependent evidence that
requires a differential diagnosis. However, he stated that it is uncommon for a judge
to apply an analysis as stringently as the court did in Zandi. He further noted that
proving causation in cases where the harm caused is cancer is an endeavor in which
plaintiff-side attorneys commonly struggle.
202. Zandi v. Wyeth, No. A08-1455, 2009 WL 2151141, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. July
21, 2009).
203. 586 F.3d 547 (8th Cir. 2009).
204. Id. at 553.
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causation.205 On appeal at the Eighth Circuit, the court found that
the expert’s differential diagnosis sufficiently established that the
defendants’ hormones were necessary to the development of the
plaintiff’s tumor.206 Accordingly, the court rejected the defendants’
argument that the plaintiff’s expert’s methodology was neither
sound nor accepted.207
This comparison supports the contention that Daubert
represents a “relax[ation of] the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’
testimony.”208 While Daubert and Frye-Mack both focus on scrutiny of
the evidence’s methodology,209 the analysis under Daubert gives less
weight to the general acceptance finding.210 Moreover, Daubert,
unlike Frye-Mack, does not entirely limit a court’s scrutiny to
methodology.211 This flexibility allows a Daubert court to consider a
broader range of evidence to meet a less stringent admissibility
standard.212 As the Eighth Circuit noted, “[t]here is no single
requirement for admissibility as long as the proffer indicates that the
expert evidence is reliable and relevant.”213 If, as seen in Zandi, the
“underlying scientific evidence” in MRE 702 is interpreted to mean
the exact proposition being asserted, then Frye-Mack’s general
acceptance requirement appears to make Frye-Mack a stiffer standard
than Daubert.214

205. See id. at 565.
206. Id. at 565–66. The Prempro Products court went on to distinguish its holding
from Zandi, stating, “To the extent that Zandi excludes an expert opinion that relies
on differential diagnosis to determine the cause of hormone-receptor-positive
breast cancer in an individual with hormone-dependent breast cancer, we
respectfully disagree.” Id. at 567 n.13.
207. Id. at 567. Instead, the Wyeth court justified inclusion of the evidence
because the defendants “had the opportunity to expose the testimony’s weaknesses
through vigorous cross-examination and the presentation of contrary evidence.” Id.
(citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993)).
208. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S.
153, 169 (1988)).
209. Id. at 592–93.
210. Id. at 593–95 (discussing the factors a court may consider under Daubert).
211. Compare General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (allowing a
judge to consider the link between evidence and proffered opinion), with Goeb v.
Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 815 (Minn. 2000) (limiting scrutiny to methodology).
212. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93.
213. In re Prempro Prod. Liab. Litig. v. Wyeth, 586 F.3d 547, 565 (8th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Unrein v. Timesavers, Inc., 394 F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2005)).
214. The Eighth Circuit disagreed with Zandi’s exclusion of the evidence and
noted that “Minnesota law requires a more conservative review of expert testimony
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The Zandi decision, as compared to In re Prempro Products
Liability Litigation, is a clear example in which Frye-Mack proved more
demanding than Daubert because of how narrowly general
acceptance was interpreted.215 However, some attorneys would argue
that the lack of Minnesota precedent consistent with Zandi tells a
different story.216 Under this argument, Zandi represents an
exception to the idea that Frye-Mack is a tamer standard to which
evidence is consistently applied without substantial dispute.217
Whether or not Zandi represents the Frye-Mack rule or its exception,
Zandi illuminates how determining what must be generally accepted
under Frye can significantly alter the admissibility determination.

than the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Id. at 567 n.13
(distinguishing Zandi v. Wyeth, No. A08-1455, 2009 WL 2151141 (Minn. Ct. App.
July 21, 2009)).
215. Zandi, 2009 WL 2151141, at *5–12. Analysis of fibromyalgia testimony
provides another example in which Daubert’s flexible and discretionary standard
resulted in courts admitting evidence that Frye-Mack excluded. Compare Epp v.
Lauby, 715 N.W.2d 501, 511 (Neb. 2006) (holding under a Daubert standard that
evidence sufficiently supported a theory of a causal relationship between physical
trauma and fibromyalgia), and Reichert v. Phipps, 84 P.3d 353, 356, 364 (Wyo. 2004)
(holding under Daubert that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence
linking an auto accident to fibromyalgia), with Grant v. Boccia, 137 P.3d 20, 25
(Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (excluding under Frye testimony linking trauma and
fibromyalgia per lack of general acceptance of a causal relationship between trauma
and fibromyalgia in the scientific community). But see Maras v. Avis Rent a Car Sys.,
Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 801, 810–11 (D. Minn. 2005) (applying Daubert to exclude
testimony proffered to establish that an auto accident aggravated fibromyalgia).
216. While not being litigated in Minnesota, recent decisions in the Johnson &
Johnson Talcum Powder litigation resulted in Daubert proving tougher than Frye. In
St. Louis Circuit Court, Missouri, which applies a Frye-Mack-like standard, three cases
have survived challenges to expert testimony and have resulted in hundreds of
millions in damages. See Nassim Benchaabane, St. Louis Jury Awards $70 Million to
Woman Claiming Baby Powder Products Contributed to Her Cancer, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/st-louis-jury
-awards-million-to-woman-claiming-baby-powder/article_6bfaef72-4dc6-50a3-af24
-fe91944b79e6.html. Conversely, a New Jersey state court applied a standard closer
to Daubert in excluding the plaintiff’s experts and ultimately dismissing two talcum
powder lawsuits against Johnson & Johnson. See Kenneth Bradley, Johnson & Johnson
Beats 2 Suits Claiming Talc Caused Cancer, 34 WESTLAW J. TOXIC TORTS 1, 4 (2016).
217. Goldenberg, supra note 201. This author spoke with Mr. Goldenberg about
the Zandi and In re Prempro Products Liability Litigation decisions. Mr. Goldenberg
believed Zandi to be the rare case in which a judge required general acceptance of
such a precise proposition and argued that the lack of supportive case law reveals
how infrequently general acceptance is fatal to expert testimony.
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Who Is the Relevant Scientific Community?

Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 requires that evidence
admitted under the novel scientific theory be generally accepted in
the relevant scientific community.218 Disagreement exists as to whom
this community encompasses because the community may include
practitioners, researchers, and others with knowledge, many of
whom may have a personal stake in the case outcome.219
Minnesota is one of the vast majority of states whose courts agree
that the relevant scientific community extends beyond
practitioners.220 Minnesota courts have interpreted Frye to allow all
experts in the scientific field to be included in the relevant scientific
community.221 This interpretation can cut both ways—favoring
plaintiffs and defendants depending on the evidence at issue—but
reveals how the result may change if a court manipulates the margins
of the relevant community.222 While Frye intended to defer entirely
to the relevant scientific community, a court’s definition of relevant
scientific community clearly is discretionary and can shape a Frye
hearing’s outcome.223 Despite this possibility, Minnesota’s broad
approach does not appear to have caused glaring problems with FryeMack.

218. MINN. R. EVID. 702.
219. See generally Simon A. Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire and into the Fryeing Pan?
Self-Validation, Meta-Expertise and the Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye
Jurisdictions, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 453, 473–80 (2008) (discussing the differing
views on and consequences of how courts define “relevant scientific community”).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 164 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975)
(rejecting the contention that polygraph evidence need only be generally accepted
by polygraph operators); Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d
150, 161 (Minn. 2012) (discussing the relevant scientific community to include
clinicians and researchers).
221. See State v. Fenney, 448 N.W.2d 54, 60 (Minn. 1989) (“Minnesota’s
interpretation of Frye requires ‘experts in its field’ and has no such narrow
requirement of disinterestedness.”); see also State v. Dixon, 822 N.W.2d 664, 674
(Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (defining the relevant scientific community as “experts in
the field”).
222. See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 397 (Alaska 1999) (noting that Frye has
been criticized for its tendency to allow a court to manipulate relevant scientific
field to shape general acceptance).
223. See Cole, supra note 219, at 473 (discussing how the definition of the
relevant scientific community can shape a Frye determination in voice spectrography
cases).
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When Is a Theory Generally Accepted?

Even if the relevant scientific community is identified, just when
that community has generally accepted a theory remains unclear.
The Goeb court elected not to define general acceptance, instead
leaving future case law to make determinations as “issues properly
present themselves.”224 In defining this threshold, courts have held
that experts in the field must widely share the view.225 However,
courts have said that general acceptance “requires neither unanimity
nor acceptance outside its particular field”226 and that courts may
receive input on this inquiry from other jurisdictions.227
The boundaries of the general acceptance threshold are
explorable, though unsatisfyingly not revealed, by analyzing the
recent case law on repressed memory syndrome. In C.A.H. v.
Holden,228 the trial court was charged with determining whether
repressed memory syndrome satisfied the Frye-Mack standard for the
specific purpose of tolling a statute of limitations in a sexual abuse
case.229 Applying a straightforward analysis, the court found
repressed memory to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community because the syndrome was included in the DSM-IV.230
In 2009, the year before C.A.H. was decided, the Minnesota
district court in Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis issued an
opposite ruling.231 In Doe, a parishioner brought negligence and
fraud claims against the archdiocese for the archdiocese’s role in
alleged sexual abuse by one of its priests.232 As in C.A.H., the central
question in Doe was whether the plaintiff could introduce general
expert testimony regarding memory repression and recovery to toll

224. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000).
225. State v. Kromah, 657 N.W.2d 564, 565 n.2 (Minn. 2003).
226. Fenney, 558 N.W.2d at 58.
227. Id. at 61.
228. C.A.H. v. Holden, No. 73-CV-09-7108, 2010 WL 6566538 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 15, 2010).
229. Id.
230. Id. The DSM-IV, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, “is
a book of diagnoses and criteria published by the American Psychiatric Association
and is based on professional consensus in the field of psychology.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
231. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, No. 62-C9-06-003962, 2009 WL 5576242
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 8, 2009), rev’d, 801 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d,
817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012).
232. Id.
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a statute of limitations.233 The plaintiff’s two experts and the
defendant’s three experts were quickly deemed representative of the
relevant scientific community,234 but serious debate existed between
the two sides regarding the syndrome’s validity. Some clinicians
accepted that repressed and recovered memory was a valid theory
and supported its diagnosis in the DSM-IV.235 Conversely,
researchers communicated deep concerns with the theory and
argued that the plaintiff failed to distinguish the theory from an
ordinary person forgetting and later remembering an idea.236 Due
to this lack of consensus, the court excluded the evidence, finding
that “something cannot be both controversial and generally
accepted.”237
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, finding Frye-Mack
inapplicable because repressed memory evidence involved “[n]o
‘method’ . . . for general acceptance or non-acceptance by the
scientific community.”238 By taking this route, the court of appeals
shed no light on whether repressed memory was generally accepted.
The Minnesota Supreme Court likewise eluded answering the
general acceptance question. The court neither accepted nor
rejected the district court’s conclusion that evidence cannot be
highly controversial and generally accepted.239 The court reasoned
that Frye-Mack need not be applied if the evidence can be excluded
under any of the first three parts in MRE 702.240 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of the evidence under
the foundational reliability prong and performed no formal Frye
analysis.241

233. Id. The experts were not intending to testify about the plaintiff specifically;
instead, the experts intended only to testify generally about repressed memory
condition to help the jury understand the plaintiff’s conduct and testimony.
Respondent’s Brief and Addendum, Doe, 817 N.W.2d 150 (No. A10-1951), 2011 WL
8815649, at *17–18.
234. Doe, 2009 WL 5576242 at *8.
235. See id. The DSM-IV “is a tool used mainly by clinical psychologists and
psychiatrists . . . to diagnose mental illness.” Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 161 n.4.
236. Doe, 2009 WL 5576242 at *24–25.
237. Id. at *22.
238. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 801 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150.
239. See Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 165.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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The inconsistency between C.A.H. and each of the three Doe
decisions rekindles the debate underlying Goeb’s holding. The trial
court in Doe noted considerable uncertainty regarding repressed
memory’s general acceptance.242 “Since the purpose of a FryeMack hearing is so the court is not called upon to play the role of
scientist, the court defers resolution of this great debate to the
relevant scientific community . . . .”243 Was Frye-Mack intended to
preclude any reliability or helpfulness inquiry if the defendant’s
experts convinced the trial court that the evidence was not generally
accepted? If not, would a more discretionary analysis by a Daubert
judge deliver a different outcome?
Under Daubert, the district court’s analysis in Doe would have
differed. Controversy within the scientific community does not
necessarily exclude the evidence under Daubert.244 Under Daubert,
each judge faced with novel scientific evidence must perform “‘a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether the
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue.’”245 This assessment may allow “shaky but admissible”
testimony attackable by cross-examination, contrary evidence, and
careful jury instruction.246 Under this discretionary Daubert test,
several courts have admitted the same repressed memory testimony
that Doe excluded.247
242. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. 62-C9-06-003962, 2009
WL 5576242 at *24–25 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 8, 2009) (“The court is struck by the
deep controversy surrounding the question of whether or not repressed and
recovered memory is a real psychiatric condition or a much more natural process
involving something closer to a process of normal forgetting.”), rev’d, 801 N.W.2d
203, rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150.
243. Id. at *25.
244. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)
(“‘General acceptance’ is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of
scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . .”).
245. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 811 (Minn. 2000) (quoting Daubert,
509 U.S. at 592–93).
246. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
247. See, e.g., Clark v. Edison, 881 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Mass. 2012); Shahzade v.
Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286 (D. Mass. 1996) (finding repressed memory to satisfy the
requisite validity and reliability under the Daubert standard); Isely v. Capuchin
Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (denying defendant’s motion to
exclude testimony concerning repressed memory syndrome under the Daubert
standard). But see Hunter v. Brown, No. 03A01-9504-CV-00127, 1996 WL 57944
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (excluding repressed memory evidence under Daubert
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Whether or not the evidence in Doe should have been admitted,
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Doe created more questions than it
answered. Frye-Mack was intended to achieve uniformity among
district courts.248 The discrepancy between C.A.H. and Doe reveals
the difficulty of achieving this end. However, the varying district
court decisions are less problematic than the uncertainty present
after the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Doe did not resolve
the question of general acceptance based on inclusion in the DSMIV or of the theory in general.249 The Doe trial court found no general
acceptance of the same theory due to controversy,250 the Doe
appellate court found general acceptance irrelevant because the
science was not subject to Frye-Mack,251 and the Doe supreme court
gave no answer on general acceptance but found the evidence
foundationally unreliable.252 To further complicate things, the Doe
supreme court’s foundational reliability analysis seemed to include
consideration of general acceptance, which further complicates FryeMack.253 A trial court determining general acceptance of repressed
memory, or similar social science evidence, has little more guidance
after Doe than before it. Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
failure in Doe to decide general acceptance sets an unstable
precedent that fails to carry out Frye-Mack’s uniformity objective.
C.

What Does Foundational Reliability Entail?

In most cases, the disputed evidence is not novel and is generally
accepted, thus the case centers on foundational reliability.254
because it is too contradictory), aff’d on other grounds, 955 S.W.2d 49 (1997).
248. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 814.
249. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150, 161 n.5,
170 n.8 (Minn. 2012).
250. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. 62-C9-06-003962, 2009
WL 5576242, at *25 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 8, 2009), rev’d, 801 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2011), rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150.
251. Doe, 801 N.W.2d at 207, rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150.
252. Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 165.
253. See infra Section III.C.2.
254. Goldenberg, supra note 201; Weiner, supra note 48. These attorneys agreed
that only in rare cases is purportedly “novel” evidence proffered. Even if the defense
argues that a Frye hearing is required, these attorneys find that, in a vast majority of
cases, proving a methodology’s general acceptance is a relatively objective,
undisputed hurdle. Therefore, these attorneys focus on developing an expert’s
foundational reliability for the testimony being proffered because this is commonly
the bulk of the dispute before a judge.
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Foundational reliability represents the “Mack” prong in the twopronged Frye-Mack test.255 After analyzing general acceptance, Mack
directs a court to determine the reliability of the evidence.256 If the
evidence is no longer considered novel, then a court is to focus on
this Mack prong.257
The 2006 amendment to MRE 702, which codified Goeb,
requires that all evidence, not just novel scientific evidence, have
foundational reliability.258 Foundational reliability for novel
scientific theory subject to Frye-Mack “requires the ‘proponent of a
. . . test to establish that the test itself is reliable and that its
administration in the particular instance conformed to the
procedure necessary to ensure reliability.’”259 Foundational
reliability for all other testimony under MRE 702 “requires a district
court to consider the purpose for which the expert testimony is
being offered, the reliability of the underlying theory, and the
reliability of the evidence in the particular case.”260 Thus, MRE 702
appears to recognize two separate but related standards: one for
scientific expert testimony and another for non-scientific expert
opinion.261 The advisory committee comments noted, however, that
the foundational reliability test will vary by context.262
The following analysis is organized in two parts. The first part
examines how Minnesota courts analyze foundational reliability. The
second part focuses on Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis to
examine whether Minnesota courts are beginning to implicitly
accept a Daubert-like analysis.

255. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 810 (Minn. 2000).
256. Id.
257. State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn. 2002).
258. MINN. R. EVID. 702.
259. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 814 (citing State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn.
1990)).
260. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150, 169 (Minn.
2012).
261. MINN. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment (“If
the opinion or evidence involves a scientific test, the case law requires that the judge
assure that the proponent establish that ‘the test itself is reliable and that its
administration in the particular instance conformed to the procedure necessary to
ensure reliability.’” (quoting Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 814)).
262. Id.

660

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

1.

[Vol. 43:3

Foundational Reliability Under MRE 702

Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 requires only that “the
opinion” have foundational reliability.263 Additionally, as with all
expert testimony, the evidence must assist the trier of fact.264
Foundational reliability determinations are largely discretionary.265
These determinations are reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard, which further expands a trial court’s discretion.266
Despite this discretion, some trial courts applying Frye-Mack have
been demanding and precise about the showing required to
demonstrate foundational reliability. For instance, in Zandi v. Wyeth,
the court excluded the plaintiff’s experts for lack of foundation.267
Here, the plaintiff sought to establish foundation for evidence that
the defendant’s hormone therapy caused the plaintiff’s breast
cancer.268 Rather than rely on a broad foundation regarding the
correlation between the drug and cancer, the court required
foundation for the proposition that “there is a method by which a
physician can determine the cause of breast cancer in a particular
individual.”269 This presents a high obstacle for a party seeking to
demonstrate foundation for testimony on a subject for which there
exists an indiscrete number of potential causes.
Similarly, in Kedrowski v. Lycoming Engines,270 the trial court
excluded expert testimony because it lacked foundational reliability
sufficient to prove that the defendant’s fuel pump caused the
plaintiff’s plane crash injuries.271 The court asked whether “the
expert’s opinion [was] sufficiently reliable so the opinions rendered
[were] not speculative and [would] assist the trier of fact.”272 The
court recognized that the reliability requirement does not require
exclusion of all other potential causation theories and stated that it
is a jury’s duty to accept or reject an expert’s opinion.273

263. MINN. R. EVID. 702.
264. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 814 (citing State v. Nystrom, 596 N.W.2d 256, 259
(Minn. 1999)).
265. See State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1990).
266. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d. at 815.
267. No. 27-CV-06-6744, 2007 WL 3224242 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 15, 2007).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. No. 62-CV-12-9581, 2016 WL 4919830 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 16, 2016).
271. Id. at *5–12.
272. Id. at *5.
273. Id. at *6 (citing Bernloehr v. Cent. Livestock Buying Co., 296 Minn. 222,
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Nevertheless, after the jury awarded a $27 million verdict, the court
awarded the defendant judgment as a matter of law because the
plaintiff’s expert failed to employ scientifically reliable or valid
testing methodology and failed to reliably discount alternate
causes.274
A less demanding test was applied in C.A.H. v. Holden.275 Here,
the trial court was analyzing the plaintiff’s psychologist’s
determination that the plaintiff suffered from repressed memory
syndrome.276 The defendant then retained a psychologist who
concluded that the plaintiff did not suffer from repressed
memory.277 Both psychologists used comparable methodologies—a
mix of testing, interviewing, and self-reporting—to evaluate the
plaintiff.278 The trial court cited Goeb in concluding that the methods
used were “common diagnostic practice in the field of psychology
and, therefore, ha[ve] foundational reliability.”279 This foundational
reliability determination was exclusively based on the reliability and
consistency of the methods, not the validity of the science.280 This
methodology-centered analysis is consistent with Goeb.281
A similarly relaxed test was applied in Rush v. Jostock.282 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld a trial court determination that
expert testimony was admissible to prove that a plaintiff was
malingering her pain symptoms.283 Applying an analysis at odds with
the district court’s conclusion in Doe, the Rush court held that
evidence of malingering was admissible because the test to show
malingering was included in the DSM-IV.284 Moreover, the court
cited Frye-Mack but instead admitted the testimony as reliable based
largely on the expert witness’s qualifications and experience.285

225, 208 N.W.2d 753, 755 (1973)).
274. Id. at *10–12.
275. C.A.H. v. Holden, No. 73-CV-09-7108, 2010 WL 6566538 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 15, 2010).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See id.
281. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 816 (Minn. 2000) (affirming the
district court’s conclusion that the expert’s methodology was unreliable).
282. 710 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
283. Id. at 576.
284. Id. at 573–77.
285. See id. at 575–76, 575 n.2.
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Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis: The
Minnesota Supreme Court’s Subtle Shift Toward Daubert

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Doe v. Archdiocese of
St. Paul & Minneapolis highlights three subtle shifts toward Daubert.286
First, the court blended the foundational reliability tests for scientific
and non-scientific testimony.287 Second, the court applied a factorbased analysis similar to Daubert.288 Third, the court’s analysis
implied that a judge may consider validity, not just reliability, in its
foundational reliability analysis.289
First, the supreme court in Doe moved away from Frye-Mack by
merging previously separate foundational reliability tests.290 The trial
court in Doe applied a Frye-Mack foundational reliability test,
requiring the plaintiff to show that the theory of repressed memory
“is reliable and trustworthy, based upon well-recognized scientific
principles and independent validation, and that its administration in
the particular instance conformed to the procedure necessary to
ensure reliability.”291 Under this standard, the trial court found the
studies underlying repressed memory syndrome unreliable because
the studies did not provide sufficient information on the scope of a
subject’s memory loss or the accuracy of the recovered memories.292
Because the science at issue was not patently scientific, the
plaintiff argued that a general MRE 702 foundational reliability test
was appropriate.293 The Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis evaded
this argument by holding that the foundational reliability
requirement in MRE 702 is substantially the same for scientific and
non-scientific expert opinions.294 Therefore, the supreme court held

286. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn.
2012).
287. Id. at 168.
288. Id. at 168–69.
289. Id. at 166–68 (looking beyond methodology to analyze whether the
evidence could prove the accuracy of plaintiff’s repressed memories).
290. Id. at 168.
291. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. 62-C9-06-003962, 2009
WL 5576242 at *26 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 8, 2009) (citing Sentinel Mgmt. Co. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 615 N.W.2d 819, 824 (Minn. 2000)), rev’d, 801 N.W.2d 203
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012).
292. Doe, 2009 WL 5576242 at *29.
293. Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 166.
294. Id. at 168.
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that the trial court’s application of Frye-Mack instead of a more
general MRE 702 test was a “de facto Rule 702 analysis.”295
Based on this holding and MRE 702’s language, a trial judge
must now analyze foundational reliability by asking whether “the
theory forming the basis for the expert’s opinion or test is
reliable.”296 This question requires consideration of “the purpose for
which the expert testimony is being offered, the reliability of the
underlying theory, and the reliability of the evidence in the
particular case.”297 By eliminating in a foundational reliability
analysis any formal distinctions between evidence subject to MRE
702, the court moved closer to Daubert and Kumho Tire Co., which
together allow a judge to discretionarily determine reliability of all
expert testimony in light of the case’s particular circumstances.298
Second, the Doe court hinted at a shift toward Daubert by
applying a factor-based analysis. The Doe court stated that a district
court need only examine “the relevant foundational reliability
factors” in its analysis.299 Without enumerating the factors relevant,
the supreme court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the
plaintiff failed to establish the accuracy of repressed memories and
failed to distinguish between repressed memory and forgetfulness.300
In its opinion, the supreme court focused on three facts. First,
the court stated that the studies underlying repressed memory did
not distinguish repressed memory from other memory loss.301
Second, the court agreed that “the accuracy of the recovered
memories has not been scientifically established.”302 Third, the court
found “that there was no way to tell whether a person was actually
suffering from repressed memories in any given case.”303 These
factors bear similarity to three Daubert factors: rate of error, general
acceptance, and testability of the theory.304

295. Id. at 169. The court also stated that “it makes little difference whether the
district court called the analysis a ‘Frye-Mack’ analysis or a ‘Rule 702’ analysis.” Id. at
168.
296. Id. at 166.
297. Id. at 169.
298. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158 (1999).
299. Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 168.
300. Id. at 169.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 (1993).
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Third, the Doe court’s analysis resembled a Daubert analysis by
looking past methodology and into validity. Goeb limited a court’s
reliability analysis to methodology.305 In Doe, however, the court
excluded the evidence based in part on accuracy grounds, not based
solely on whether the underlying methodology was reliable and
consistent.306 Specifically, the court relied on the trial court’s finding
of insufficient proof that the plaintiff actually suffered from
repressed memory.307 This analysis hints at a conclusion similar to
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, which allows a judge to “conclude that
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered.”308
Frye-Mack intended to relieve judges from having to analyze an
expert’s reasoning or deductions, instead leaving this issue for the
jury.309 But, by applying an approach inclusive of validity and based
loosely on factors, the court in Doe moved closer to Daubert and astray
from Frye-Mack’s deferential, “nose counting” approach.310 Further,
by deciding the case based on reliability—which is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard—rather than general acceptance—
reviewed de novo—the court exercised even greater discretion.
Doe triggers a key question about how Frye-Mack is now applied:
if general acceptance plays a role in a foundational reliability
analysis, and this foundational reliability analysis applies to all
evidence under MRE 702, then what purpose does the added
general acceptance requirement for novel scientific evidence serve?
This question requires future scrutiny as courts continue to perform
foundational reliability analyses consistent with Doe.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
One solution to the problems identified in this Note would be,
as others have argued,311 to join the vast majority of courts that apply
Daubert. However, given how politically charged this debate is,
compromise may be prudent. Another solution would be to retain
305. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 816 (Minn. 2000).
306. See Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 168.
307. Id. at 168.
308. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.136, 146 (1997).
309. See Sentinel Mgmt. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 615 N.W.2d 819, 823–24
(Minn. 2000) (holding that validity of an expert’s extrapolation goes to weight, not
admissibility, and is thus a jury question).
310. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 813.
311. See, e.g., Gildea, supra note 49, at 105–09; Harley, supra note 68, at 497–508.
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Frye’s deferential qualities and reconcile the inconsistencies
identified in this Note. To do so, several changes should be
considered.
First, it would be sensible to redefine what evidence is subject to
a general acceptance test. Presently, general acceptance applies to
all novel scientific theory.312 Trying to determine whether evidence
is scientific has proven problematic.313 Accordingly, it would
behoove the Minnesota Supreme Court to narrow the applicability
of Frye’s general acceptance test to novel testimony of the “hard
science” variety. Science of this categorization (chemistry, physics,
biology, and similar physical or mechanical processes), as compared
to social or behavioral science, presents the highest risk of
misleading triers of fact.314 For “hard” science that is deemed novel
or cutting edge, Frye can appropriately be applied to ensure judges
properly defer to the scientific field.315 For social or behavior science,
as seen in MacLellan and Doe, a traditional MRE 702 analysis can
sufficiently ensure helpfulness, qualification, and reliability.316
Next, to ensure proper application of this standard, Minnesota
courts must recognize that Frye has divorced Mack. For Goeb, Doe, and
MRE 702 to coexist, foundational reliability must be applied to the
unique characteristics of each expert opinion.317 This foundational
reliability analysis is detached from any Frye analysis. In Obeta and Doe,
312. MINN. R. EVID. 702.
313. Compare Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 801 N.W.2d 203,
207–08 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (deeming Frye-Mack the wrong framework for
evaluating the admissibility of repressed memory evidence), rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150
(Minn. 2012), with Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 2009 WL 5576242,
at *25 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 8, 2009) (excluding repressed memory evidence under
Frye-Mack as not generally accepted), rev’d, 801 N.W.2d 203, rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150.
314. See State v. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 231 (Minn. 2005) (citing People
v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 403–04 (Mich. 1990)).
315. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000).
316. See MINN. R. EVID. 702. This does not solve the problem of determining what
evidence is novel and thus subject to general acceptance. This author sees no
concrete method of remedying this dilemma—any line drawn or definition
proposed will prove imperfect in practice. Daubert eliminated this problem by
forming an inclusive and comprehensive standard that works to implicitly exclude
evidence that Frye would judge not generally accepted. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). However, if Minnesota trial lawyers find
Frye’s purported benefits to outweigh the detriment posed by the “novel” ambiguity,
then this may be too limited a problem to warrant change.
317. See MINN. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment
(stating that the required foundation will vary by context).
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the Minnesota Supreme Court referred to Frye-Mack as the fourth
part of MRE 702.318 But, it is truly only Frye, not Frye-Mack, that the
fourth part of MRE 702 describes.319 Clearly, for novel, hard science
evidence, the foundational reliability inquiry may resemble previous
Mack applications.320 But, continuing to refer to the standard for all
MRE 702 evidence as Frye-Mack causes confusion in application
because MRE 702 includes a separate foundational reliability
requirement that may differ from Mack and not trigger Frye.
Finally, appellate courts tasked with Frye questions must give Frye
answers. While not a proposed rule change, this notion carries great
importance. Trial courts, correctly or not, commonly rely on
precedent to determine whether proffered opinions must be
scrutinized under Frye.321 Appellate courts disservice trial courts by
not deciding cases on the merits to create this precedent.322 By not
aiding in this Frye determination, appellate courts fail to foster the
uniformity and precedent-based aims underlying Minnesota’s
standard.
V. CONCLUSION
At day’s end, judges follow rigid rules rigidly and flexible rules
flexibly. Frye-Mack represents a rigid test that aims to facilitate
uniform decisions on complex issues.323 Frye-Mack further intends to
rid judges of discretion on complicated scientific issues by deferring
in these issues to the relevant scientific community.324
To achieve these ends, Frye-Mack requires a consistent and
concrete standard that trial courts can apply. In Doe v. Archdiocese of
St. Paul & Minneapolis,325 the court’s analysis underscored several key
problems with Frye-Mack and created others. By failing to address

318. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150, 164–65
(Minn. 2012); State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 294 (Minn. 2011).
319. MINN. R. EVID. 702 (referring in part four to general acceptance, not
foundational reliability).
320. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000) (requiring the
proponent to establish that “the test itself is reliable and that its administration in
the particular instance conformed to the procedure necessary to ensure
reliability”).
321. See supra Section III.A.1.
322. State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d. 91, 108 (Minn. 2010) (Meyer, J., concurring).
323. See Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 811.
324. See id. at 815.
325. 817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012).
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what constitutes novel scientific theory,326 particularly regarding
issues of social science, the court failed to execute Frye-Mack’s goal of
uniformity. Also, by applying a factor-based analysis inclusive of
general acceptance and validity,327 and by merging the foundational
reliability tests for scientific and non-scientific evidence,328 the Doe
court moved closer to a Daubert-like analysis. In doing so, the court
further clouded the role that general acceptance plays in a Frye-Mack
analysis.
Frye has clear benefits: it allows judges to defer to scientists on
complex scientific opinions, it seeks to prevent judges from
exercising undue discretion in deciding admissibility, and it fosters
uniformity in decisions if properly applied.329 To reap these benefits,
Minnesota should consider amending its standard for admitting
expert testimony by limiting Frye to novel opinions of “hard” science,
separating Frye from Mack, and encouraging appellate courts to
provide Frye issues with Frye answers to promote lower court
uniformity.330

326. Id. at 165 (electing not to consider Frye-Mack’s applicability to repressed
memory evidence).
327. Id. at 168.
328. Id. (deeming Frye-Mack’s reliability test substantially the same as a nonscientific test under MRE 702).
329. See Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 813–14.
330. See supra Part IV.
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